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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
John A. Judd appeals from the district court's Order issued July 2, 2008, 
dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. In this Order, the district court 
dismissed Mr. Judd's post-conviction petition and denied his Motion and Affidavit in 
Support for Appointment of Counsel at the same time. In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Judd 
argued that the district court erred when it failed to rule on his motion to appoint counsel 
prior to dismissing his petition. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-9.) In response, the State 
argues that this was not erroneous, and even if it was, any error was harmless because 
Mr. Judd's petition was untimely. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-10.) This Reply Brief is 
necessary to address the State's argument that any error was harmless. Mr. Judd 
contends that a harmless error analysis should not be applied in this case and, 
alternatively, if a harmless error analysis is applied, the error was not harmless because 
he provided both the possibility of a valid post-conviction claim and the possibility of a 
valid argument for equitable tolling of the time to file his petition. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Judd's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it failed to rule on Mr. Judd's motion for appointment of 




The District Court Erred When It Failed To Rule On Mr. Judd's Motion For Appointment 
Of Counsel Prior To Dismissing Mr. Judd's Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
In response to Mr. Judd's argument that the district court erred when it failed to 
rule on his motion for appointment of counsel prior to summarily dismissing his petition, 
the State asserts that Mr. Judd's "post-conviction petition was plainly untimely; thus, he 
failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim, and cannot show any harm in the denial of 
his motion for appointed counsel." (Respondent's Brief, p.4.) However, this assertion 
that the error in failing to rule on a motion for counsel can be subject to a harmless error 
analysis, is contrary to the law set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Charboneau v. 
State, 140 Idaho 789,102 P.3d 1108 (2004) and Swaderv. State, 143 Idaho 651,152 
P.3d 12 (2007). Furthermore, Mr. Judd contends if a harmless error analysis is 
employed in this case, the error was not harmless because he provided both the 
possibility of a valid post-conviction claim and the possibility of a valid argument for 
equitable tolling of the time to file his petition. 
B. The State's Argument That A Harmless Error Analysis Should Be Employed In 
This Case Is Contrary To Charboneau And Swader 
In response to Mr. Judd's argument on appeal that the district court erred in 
denying his motion for appointment of counsel at the same time it dismissed his petition, 
the State argues that, even if this was improper, the appointment of counsel issue 
should not be remanded to the district court because any error is harmless. (See 
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Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10.) Rather than remanding the case for the district court to 
determine whether counsel should be appointed and to provide notice to Mr. Judd if 
counsel is not appointed, the State would have this Court decide that Mr. Judd cannot 
have an attorney citing Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 470-71, 926 P.2d 1314, 1317-
18 (Ct. App. 1996) for this proposition. (See Respondent's Brief, p.8.) 
However, the Idaho Court of Appeal's Opinion is Swisher was decided before 
both of the Idaho Supreme Court's decisions in Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 
102 P.3d 1108 (2004) and Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 152 P.3d 12 (2007) and is 
contradictory to these holdings. Charboneau requires that the district court determine 
whether counsel should be appointed and provide the defendant notice of its reasoning 
prior to dismissing a petition stating, "[a]t a minimum, the trial court must carefully 
consider the request for counsel, before reaching a decision on the substantive merits 
of the petition." 140 Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. In Swader, the Supreme 
Court subsequently clarified Charboneau's standard for appointment of counsel in post-
conviction cases, holding that the district court had failed to apply that standard (and 
had actually applied too onerous a standard) and going on to determine whether, 
applying the correct standard, counsel should have been appointed. See generally 
Swader, 143 Idaho 651, 152 P.2d 12. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that counsel 
should have been appointed and it reversed the order denying the petitioner's motion 
for appointment of counsel. Id. at 655, 152 P.3d at 16. However, in making this 
determination, the Supreme Court did not reject Charboneau and adopt the view that 
the appellate courts should now be employing a harmless error analysis; rather, the 
Court simply recognized that there is no value to remanding a case for a determination 
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of a motion for appointment of counsel where the state of the record is such that the 
denial of such a motion would amount to an abuse of the district court's discretion. See 
Swader, 143 Idaho at 653-55, 152 P.3d at 14-16. 
In addition, even if an appellate court could, and was willing to, decide whether in 
its own view, counsel should have been appointed under the correct legal standard, the 
simple fact is that an appellate court is in no position to do so. In Charboneau, the 
Court held that if the appointment of counsel is in doubt, the petitioner must be provided 
with notice of the reasons why counsel might not be appointed, as well as an 
opportunity to respond: 
It is essential that the petitioner be given adequate notice of the claimed 
defects so he has an opportunity to respond and to give the trial court an 
adequate basis for deciding the need for counsel based upon the merits of 
the claims. If the court decides that the claims in the petition are frivolous, 
the court should provide sufficient information regarding the basis for its 
ruling to enable the petitioner to supplement the request with the 
necessary additional facts, if they exist 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. Since an appellate court is in no 
position to provide a petitioner with adequate notice, the Court would have to violate 
Charboneau in order to decide the motion for the first time on appeal. Additionally, 
applying a harmless error analysis to a procedural bar, timeliness, which has an 
exception for equitable tolling that was never addressed in the lower court, ignores the 
rationale behind liberally construing a pro se petitioner's post conviction action. Thus, if 
the petitioner's entitlement to appointment of counsel is in doubt, the proper remedy is 
for the appellate court to remand the case so that the district court might provide 
adequate notice and then, when appropriate, exercise its discretion. 
Therefore, Mr. Judd submits that this Court may not hold that he is not entitled to 
the appointment of post-conviction counsel. If this Court concludes that Mr. Judd's 
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petition is sufficient to raise the possibility of a valid claim, this Court should simply order 
that counsel be appointed to represent Mr. Judd on remand. However, if this Court 
cannot conclude that Mr. Judd's petition is sufficient to raise the possibility of a valid 
claim, this Court must remand this case for the district court to rule upon Mr. Judd's 
motion for appointment of counsel under the appropriate standard articulated in 
Charboneau. 
C. Mr. Judd Presented Sufficient Evidence To Raise The Possibility Of A Valid 
Claim And. Therefore, Even If A Harmless Error Analysis Is Employed. He Is 
Entitled To The Appointment Of Counsel On Remand 
In its Respondent's Brief, the sole basis for the State's argument that any error 
was harmless is that Mr. Judd's petition was untimely. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10) 
This question of timeliness raises three issues for discussion. First whether Mr. Judd 
has shown the possibility of a valid claim? Second, if Mr. Judd has shown the 
possibility of a valid claim, is he also required to show the possibility of a valid argument 
for equitable tolling? Finally, if Mr. Judd is required to present the possibility of a valid 
equitable tolling argument, has he done so? Mr. Judd contends if a harmless error 
analysis is employed in this case, the error was not harmless because Mr. Judd's 
petition alleged facts showing both the possibility of a valid claim and the possibility of a 
valid argument for equitable tolling. 
1. Mr. Judd Has Shown The Possibility Of A Valid Claim 
"[A] needy applicant for post-conviction relief is entitled to court-appointed 
counsel unless the trial court determines that the post-conviction proceeding is 
frivolous." Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111. Idaho Code§ 19-
852(b)(3) sets for the standard for determining whether or not a post-conviction 
6 
proceeding is frivolous. It is frivolous if it is "not a proceeding that a reasonable person 
with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense." I.C. § 19-852(b)(3). 
When applying that standard to pro se applications for appointment of counsel, the trial 
court should keep in mind that petitions filed by a pro se petitioner will often be 
conclusory and incomplete. Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged 
because they do not exist, they also may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner 
does not know what the essential elements of a claim are. Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 
676, 679, 23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001). 
In Charboneau, the court determined that I.C. § 19-852 is no longer applicable to 
a post-conviction proceeding, and that "for the purposes of I.C. § 19-4904, the trial court 
should determine if the petitioner is able to afford counsel and whether this is a situation 
in which counsel should be appointed to assist the petitioner." Charboneau, 140 Idaho 
at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. If the petitioner alleges facts "to raise the possibility of a 
valid claim, the district court should appoint counsel to give the petitioner an opportunity 
to properly allege the necessary supporting facts." fd. (emphasis added). Most 
recently, in Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 152 P.3d 12 (2007), the Idaho Supreme 
Court clarified its "possibility of a valid claim" language from Charboneau. The Swader 
Court stated: 
(T]he trial court should appoint counsel if the petition alleged facts showing 
the possibility of a valid claim such that a reasonable person with 
adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a 
further investigation into the claim. The investigation by counsel may 
not produce evidence sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. But, the 
decision to appoint counsel and the decision on the merits of the petition if 
counsel is appointed are controlled by two different standards. 
fd. 143 Idaho at 655, 152 P.3d at 16 (emphasis added). 
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In his petition Mr. Judd has raised several issues with regard to the ineffective 
assistance of counsel that he received in his underlying criminal action. See Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) State v. Hayes, 138 Idaho 761, 69 P.3d 181 (Ct. 
App. 2003). Among his claims, he argued that his attorney failed to file an appeal and 
failed to file a Rule 35 motion after telling him he would do so. One of those basic 
elements defined by the Sixth Amendment is the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend IV. There is a two-pronged 
test to determine whether an attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). Thus, to prevail on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a petitioner must show that his trial counsel's 
performance was deficient and that he suffered some prejudice (i.e., a "reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different") as a result of the deficient performance. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694. 
Here, if Mr. Judd was told by his counsel he would file a Rule 35 motion, and his 
counsel did not, then he was clearly denied right to counsel and was prejudiced by this 
because he did not file a motion himself and the district court could have reduced his 
sentence if a motion had been filed. See id. Likewise, counsel's failure to file an appeal 
also presents a potential valid claim. In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), the 
United States Supreme Court held that: 
counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant 
about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational 
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defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are 
nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant 
reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing. 
Id. at 480. Therefore, at the very least, Mr. Judd presented potential viable claims 
related to his counsel's ineffective assistance by failing to file a Rule 35 motion and 
failing to file a Notice of Appeal. 
2. Mr. Judd Is Not Required To Show The Possibility Of A Valid Argument 
For Equitable Tolling 
The only basis for the State's argument that any error in this case was harmless 
is that Mr. Judd's petition was untimely filed. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10) This 
argument misunderstands the distinction between the possibility of a valid "claim," which 
is raised in a petition for post-conviction relief and may entitle a defendant to the 
requested reliefj and an argument for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, which 
is an exception to the State's an affirmative defense that a petition is untimely. See 
Chico-Rodriguez v. State, 141 Idaho 579, 114 P.3d 137 (Ct. App. 2005); Sayas v. State, 
139 Idaho 957, 88 P.3d 776 (Ct. App. 2003). Mr. Judd contends that to overcome 
harmless error, he must only show the possibility of a valid claim. 
Both Charboneau and Swader require only that a defendant raise the possibility 
of a valid claim in order to have counsel appointed, all the while cautioning the district 
court to review the post-conviction petition liberally, recognizing the physical, education, 
and mental limitations a pro se petition might encounter. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 
793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13; Swader, 143 Idaho at 653-55, 152 P.3d at 14-16. See 
also Brown v. State, 134 Idaho 676, 23 P.3d (2001). Thus, the case law only requires 
that a pro se petitioner raise the possibility of a valid claim in order for counsel to be 
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appointed, not that he include all of the elements of a valid claim, including the 
applicable exceptions to the statute of limitations for a post-conviction action. 
Furthermore, requiring that a potentially mentally incompetent petitioner, or a petitioner 
without access to legal materials, understand that equitable tolling is an exception to an 
untimely post-conviction petition, when the district court has never addressed equitable 
tolling, renders these prior holdings and the rationale behind them illusory considering 
the limitations faced by pro se petitioners. 
Therefore, because Mr. Judd raised the possibility of a valid claim as discussed 
above in section l(C)(1) supra, any error in this case was not harmless, and he should 
be entitled to the appointment of counsel. 
3. If Mr. Judd Is Required To Show The Possibility Of A Valid Argument For 
Equitable Tolling He Has Met This Burden 
In the instant case, the district court found that Mr. Judd's Petition was untimely, 
therefore it lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition. (Augmentation: Order dated July 2, 
2008.) Idaho Code§ 19-4902 provides: "An application [for Post-Conviction reliefJ may 
be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration from the time for appeal or 
from the determination of an appeal or from the determination from a proceeding 
following an appeal, whichever is later." Id. Mr. Judd concedes that his Petition was not 
filed within the timelines proscribed in § 19-4902; however, had counsel been appointed 
to represent Mr. Judd with his post-conviction action, counsel could have produced 
sufficient evidence to toll the statute of limitations due to Mr. Judd's incapacities. 
In Idaho, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for the filing of a petition for 
post conviction relief has been recognized where the defendant has been deprived of 
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access to the courts, including: "(1) where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-
state facility on an in-state conviction without legal representation or access to Idaho 
legal materials; (2) and where mental disease and/or psychotropic medication renders a 
petitioner incompetent and prevents petitioner from earlier pursuing challenges to his 
convictions." Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 960, 88 P.3d 776, 780 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Here, in his Response to the Notice to Dismiss, Mr. Judd explained that he "had 
spent his [e]ntire history in [resource] classes and special education classes." 
(Augmentation: Response to Notice to Dismiss.)1 This raises a potential issue of 
whether Mr. Judd's time to file his petition would have been tolled because his mental 
disabilities prevented him from pursing his post-conviction petition. Mr. Judd also 
explained that he did not know of his counsel's failures until he met with a contract 
attorney in 2007. (Augmentation: Response to Notice to Dismiss.) Although, it is not 
clear from this statement, if Mr. Judd was deprived of access to the courts, at the very 
least, his mental abilities might have foreclosed Mr. Judd from raising his post-
conviction claims until he met with a contract attorney who assisted him. Therefore, 
these statements raise the possibility of a valid argument that Mr. Judd's time to file his 
post-conviction petition should have been tolled. 
Mr. Judd asserts that this district court erred in failing to appoint counsel to assist 
him in his post conviction action; therefore, the denial of his motion for appointment of 
counsel was not harmless and his case should be remanded to the district court with 
1 In the Respondent's Brief, the State asserts that the Response to Notice to Dismiss, 
filed July 2, 2008, has not been made part of the record on appeal; however, an Order 
Augmenting this order into the record was issued by the Idaho Supreme Court on 
October 14, 2008. (See Respondent's Brief, p.2, n.1.) 
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instructions that counsel be appointed to guide him through the complex post-conviction 
proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Judd respectfully requests that this Court vacate the Order dismissing his 
post-conviction petition and remand his case to the district court for further 
consideration of his Motion for Appointment of Counsel prior to dismissing his petition. 
DATED this 25th day of February, 2009. 
~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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